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Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap 
Government intervention is perhaps the most universal institutional change in 
the development of modern economies. Yet there is considerable debate on the 
relationship between economic development and the expansion of government. 
The relationship has been viewed as causal, but both directions have been em- 
phasized. To many, government fosters economic growth. To others, economic 
growth, because of increased capturable rents, provides incentives for govern- 
ment to expand, and more government, it is asserted, stifles growth. This vol- 
ume explores how interest groups affected the development of government pol- 
icies,  how particular  ex ante institutional  arrangements altered the form of 
government regulation,  and  how  the  necessity  for coalition  formation  often 
transformed the structure of regulation and legislation. The eight papers in this 
volume were presented at a preconference  (in Tucson, AZ, on 30-3 1 October 
1992) and a conference (in Cambridge, MA, on 20-21  May 1993) on historical 
political economy. 
Our goal is to examine the ways constituent groups emerged and demanded 
government action to solve perceived economic problems such as exorbitant 
railroad  and  utility  rates, bank  failure, the  financing of  government,  falling 
agricultural prices, the immigration of low-skilled workers, and workplace in- 
jury. The papers are case studies of the origins of  government intervention in 
the economy, which we have termed “the regulated economy.” As  such they 
provide  a means of observing the process by  which governmental economic 
policies are formed. Because these policies remain with us today, the case stud- 
ies allow for a comparison of the historical issues that gave rise to the policies 
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with those that have kept them in place. One can also inquire whether the insti- 
tutions devised in the past are still appropriate. 
To get a sense of just how pervasive government is in the economy, consider 
the following. Total government expenditures as a fraction of GNP rose from 
about 7 percent in 1900 to about 40 percent in 1990. Government purchases as 
a fraction of GNP rose as well, although at a lower rate, from about 5 percent 
in 1900 to just under 20 percent in  1990. Prior to 1900 government, as a pro- 
portion of GNP, grew in the United States mainly because of its expansion at 
the state and local levels. In  1900 localities accounted for about 55 percent of 
total expenditures, the federal government 35 percent, and the states a mere 10 
percent. By  1940, on the eve of World War  I1 and after the inception  of the 
New Deal, the federal government was about 45 percent of total expenditures, 
the states were about 25 percent, and the localities 30 percent. Today the fed- 
eral government is about 60 percent of total expenditures, with the states and 
localities at about 20 percent each. 
Thus the pattern for government intervention in the economy in the United 
States involved an initial expansion of local and state government, with a large 
increase in the spending of localities toward the end of the nineteenth century. 
Government then proceeded to grow steadily as a fraction of GNP, and with 
that  growth  came the  centralization  of  both  spending and revenue  raising. 
Given the history of the structure of  government, it should not be surprising 
that interest-group demands for economic regulation often began locally, then 
moved to the state level, ultimately focusing at the top, the most centralized, 
tier. 
But data on the expenditure and revenue surely understate the influence of 
government on the economy. Regulatory policies, transfer programs,  various 
types of legislation, and judicial interpretation  affect economic behavior far 
beyond what budgets and staffing levels alone would  indicate.  Well-defined 
property rights, for example, can do more to foster economic efficiency than 
elaborate policies can. 
These papers are an effort to better understand  the historical development 
of government intervention. The expansion of  government is viewed in terms 
of the usual measures of government size as well as the influence government 
has had on the economy. The political process, constituent groups, their repre- 
sentatives, and prior institutions play central roles in each of the analyses. Gov- 
ernment policies are interpreted  in these case studies as responses  to the de- 
mands of constituent groups that seek the coercive power of government for 
economic gain or other goals. The political  strength of  the groups depends 
on their cohesiveness, wealth, and size. The meshing of  disparate interests by 
political parties and politicians determines the timing, content, and economic 
impact of regulation. The papers are sensitive to the complex routes by which 
government policies ultimately have emerged. Besides examining the various 
factions involved in the origins of regulatory policies, the authors explore the 3  Introduction 
linkages to other government policies and to precedents  established at other 
levels of government. 
The contributions can be grouped under several headings, although there is 
considerable overlap. How well constituency interests are reflected in legisla- 
tion and how consensus building affects the timing and content of legislation 
are directly addressed in most of the papers. Mark Kanazawa and Roger No11 
look at railroad regulation;  Werner Troesken explores gas utility regulation; 
Claudia Goldin examines the forces behind immigration restriction; and Price 
Fishback and Shawn Kantor examine workers’ compensation. But Keith Poole 
and Howard Rosenthal caution us that no piece of legislation can be viewed 
in isolation. Coasian (or other) trades within the legislature are the means of 
consensus  building,  and thus  constituent  interests ought not be viewed  in a 
narrow context. 
Other papers reveal  how  preexisting  policies,  institutions,  and  economic 
market structures shape legislation and regulatory activity. John Wallis, Rich- 
ard Sylla, and John Legler demonstrate how the initial structure of  banking 
determined how the states would later raise revenue through bank regulation. 
Charles Calomiris and Eugene White detail how preexisting state banking reg- 
ulations shaped the passage of federal legislation in the 1930s. Elizabeth Hoff- 
man and Gary Libecap show why regulation for monopoly  might fail in one 
setting while succeeding in another. 
The origins of regulation that began at the state and local levels are explored 
in several of the papers. Regulation often filtered upwards from local agencies 
to the state and ultimately to the federal level (as in railroads and public utili- 
ties). In other cases (for example, workers’ compensation) regulation remained 
at the state level, but was ultimately embraced by all states. Troesken’s contri- 
bution directly  confronts the issue by  looking  at the movement of  coal-gas 
regulation from the local to the state level. Kanazawa and No11 explore why 
states regulated railroads, whereas Poole and Rosenthal analyze similar legis- 
lation at the federal level. 
Kanazawa and No11 remind us that, although federal railroad regulation and 
the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 have received consider- 
able attention (see, for example, Poole and Rosenthal, chap. 3), government 
regulation of railroads began two decades earlier at the state level. They exam- 
ine the political economy of railroad regulation in a key Granger state to test 
versions of the economic theory  of regulation. The Illinois Constitution, re- 
vised in 1869/70,  contained explicit provisions for railroad regulation that were 
voted on both in public referenda and by delegates to the constitutional conven- 
tion. By analyzing the votes, Kanazawa and No11 can identify which economic 
interests supported or opposed the establishment of  regulation in Illinois. 
Illinois  was  the  first  state  to establish  a permanent economic regulatory 
agency (later involved in Munn v. Illinois),  and because it was in an intermedi- 
ate stage of railroad development by  1870, Kanazawa and No11 can explore the 4  Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap 
perceived effects of regulation on further railroad investment. The authors find, 
using the referendum votes, that regardless of the structure of the local railroad 
market (undeveloped, competitive, monopoly) rural communities overwhelm- 
ingly  supported  regulation,  suggesting  that  voters  believed  rate  regulation 
would redistribute income from railroads to shippers. Yet  support for regula- 
tion  was far weaker  in counties  having  no railroad  service, suggesting  that 
those constituencies feared regulation  would retard the extension of rail lines. 
The votes at the constitutional convention, however, reveal that local interest 
groups  had  less influence there.  Not  unexpectcdly,  the better-organized  and 
well-financed  railroads were inore influential in the convention voting than in 
the referendum. 
Troesken traces the evolution of  coal-gas regulation  in Chicago, following 
the movcinent of the industry from unregulated and competitive conditions, to 
municipal rcgulation,  and  finally to state regulation, all from  1878 to  1913. 
The adoption of  state regulation  and the creation of a state regulatory agency 
in Chicago  mirrored  a broader pattern  across the  states. Between  1907 and 
1922 thirty states created public  utility commissions. By  examining an early 
utility  that  moved from unfettered competition  to municipal  regulation,  and 
ultimately to state regulatory control. Troesken reveals the underlying dctermi- 
nants of a process that may have determined the transition  in other states. 
During the competitive period in the nineteenth century. entry was promoted 
by  the introduction of technology that lowered minimum-efficient  firm size. 
Incumbent firms, according to  Troesken, organized  to restrict entry through 
the Gas Acts, as they were called. These laws effectively blocked new entry by 
requiring  unanimous  approval  of  all  property  owners before  additional  gas 
lines could be  installed.  Existing  firms could easily  bribe just one property 
owner to oppose a potential  entrant. Not surprisingly, under the Gas Acts no 
new  firms entered the Chicago market. The laws also removed  the common 
law obstacles to  merger and consolidation.  As consolidation  proceeded.  the 
city council was pressured by consumer groups to regulate rates and eventually 
ordered a 25 percent rate cut. Although the mandated rates were reversed by 
the courts, they gave the industry an incentive to find a less onerous regulatory 
body. Local interests were likely to be less well represented at the state level, 
where the well-organized and better-financed gas utility industry could expect 
to do better. Hence, the industry lobbied for state regulation. State regulation 
was initiated in 19 13, and under its jurisdiction  prices increased. 
The most studied piece of American regulatory history is the establishment 
of the first regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission. Poole and 
Rosenthal revisit  the politics that brought  about that  agency, but  their main 
objective is to reveal the dynamics of interest-group politics. Although all pa- 
pers in the volume examine constituent  interests in some manner, Poole and 
Rosenthal take a rather different approach. They argue that the political coali- 
tions doing battle over government regulation are based on long-term, broadly 5  Introduction 
based preferences regarding the economic structurc of thc United States, what 
one might term “ideological” preferences. 
These coalitions go beyond narrowly defined special economic interests and 
are rooted  in the major political  parties  of their era. Indeed, a critical role of 
the political  party is to group legislators with similar ideologies and to facili-- 
tate trades among them. Individual politicians must be responsive to immediate 
constituent interests, and Poole and Rosenthal do not argue that these demand:; 
are unimportant.  Rather. they assert that by  the time a roll call vote is taken, 
many of the trades that respond to constituent interests and maintain a party’s 
coalition have already been made. Hence, the vote will follow party lines, and 
it may be difficult to discern a simple relationship between economic interests 
and voting behavior. 
Poole and Rosenthal use a spatial  model of congressional  voting  in which 
each legislator is represented by  an ideal point, determined by  that legislator‘s 
votes  on all  previous  and  subsequent  legislation.  The positions  of all  ideal 
points  maximize  the  likelihood of  predicting  legislators’  votes.  The voting 
space is divided by  a cutting line. and ideal points that cluster to one sidc of it 
are predicted to vote yea, whereas those on the other side are predicted to vote 
nay. The dimensions are abstract in theory. but  in practice one can infer their 
meaning. The first dimension is clearly political party, and the second dimen- 
sion is often urban-rural. (Two dimensions are sufficient.)  Poole and Rosenthal 
find long-run, consistent patterns of political behavior among legislators. 
The authors use this spatial framework to examine Senate and House voting 
on railroad regulation in the nineteenth century that culminated in the passage 
of  the Interstate Commerce Act of  1887. For railroad regulation the subject 
was complex, and by the time the issue reached Congress, the question was the 
degree  of  regulation,  not whether  there  should  be  regulation.  According to 
Poole and Rosenthal, the battles were over shades of regulation, and the posi- 
tions of  individual  legislators  were  mapped broadly  into the  existing  party 
structure rather than into more narrow economic interests. 
Wallis, Sylla, and Legler return the discussion to regulation at the state level. 
But rather  than focusing  on  private  constituent  interests,  they  look at those 
of the state government itself. They argue that taxes and revenue-enhancing 
regulations  could  have  been  set to maximize  the  revenue the  state received 
from the industry. In the nineteenth century, states derived close to half their 
revenue  from bank  sourccs. States chartered banks,  taxed  bank  capital,  and 
regulated the industry in myriad ways. The type of initial tax or license influ- 
enced regulations adopted subsequently. When the state restricted bank char- 
ters, for example, it could tax away the monopoly rents it created. If, instead, 
a state government imposed per unit taxes or ad valorem taxes on the banking 
industry, Wallis, Sylla, and Legler argue. it would acquire a fiscal interest  in 
promoting the industry’s output, sales, or both. But when the state taxed bank 
capital or owned stock in banks, it had an incentive to encourage bank profits. 6  Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap 
Each of the means of raising revenue gave the state a different interest in banks 
and in bank capital. 
The fiscal interest, therefore, in theory determined the type of regulation. In 
practice the authors find, using  their recently  compiled data  set on  state fi- 
nances, the interests of state governments were one of several important deter- 
minants of banking regulation. Regulations varied  across regions and within 
regions over time with changes in fiscal interests and as banking regulation 
negatively impacted the state’s economy. 
Much current federal government regulation derives from the New Deal pe- 
riod. Voters clamored to the government for relief during the Great Depression. 
New opportunities  emerged for interest groups to organize more effectively 
and for political entrepreneurs to advance their agendas. Legislation was en- 
acted and administrative agencies were formed to design the details of regula- 
tion, often with the close cooperation  of the industry to be regulated. These 
institutions remain  today, a legacy of  the New Deal, with powerful  interest- 
group support and entrenched bureaucracies, even though most of the initiating 
conditions have long since passed. 
Federal deposit insurance became  law in  1933, and Calomiris and White 
explore this enduring legacy of New Deal banking legislation. Federal deposit 
insurance originated  at the state level, but the state experiences were appar- 
ently disasters. In the years prior to its national passage, deposit insurance had 
little broad  voter appeal  and only lukewarm  support  from small,  rural, unit 
banks. It was vehemently opposed by large, branch banks and within the Roo- 
sevelt administration. Federal deposit insurance had long been viewed as spe- 
cial interest legislation and was repeatedly rejected by Congress over a period 
of fifty years. 
State deposit  insurance,  note the  authors, was enacted in states with unit 
bank laws, small banks, and high bank-failure  rates. All state deposit insur- 
ance schemes went bankrupt in the 1920s. Between 1886 and 1933, 150 bills 
were introduced in Congress to establish federal deposit insurance, but only 
one, that in 1913, had a roll call vote. Thus Calomiris and White examine the 
source of support for the legislation by analyzing the states of the bills’ authors. 
The bills were championed by representatives from states with disproportion- 
ate numbers  of  rural  unit banks  that  were vulnerable  to failure. They  were 
precisely the states that had enacted their own insurance schemes, all of which 
became deeply troubled. The authors also examine the 1913 roll call vote in 
the House of  Representatives and find that unit banking, small average bank 
size, and high rates of bank failure were all associated with support for legisla- 
tion. States that expected to benefit from cross-subsidization of risk in national 
deposit insurance supported the legislation, whereas those having stable bank- 
ing systems opposed it. In  1933 federal deposit insurance was adopted with 
near unanimity, and its alternative for stabilizing the banking sector-nation- 
wide branch banking-was  rejected. 7  Introduction 
Calomiris  and White argue that the passage of  federal  deposit  insurance 
cannot be explained as an emergency measure conceived in haste to resolve an 
ongoing crisis. Rather, the policy  was engineered by a political entrepreneur, 
Representative Steagall (of the Glass-Steagall Act that inaugurated deposit in-- 
surance), who took advantage of changing circumstances in the 1930s to pro- 
mote deposit insurance. Unit banks, which had pushed for deposit insurance., 
were weakened economically and politically by the Depression. But influential 
urban states came to favor deposit insurance in response to bank failures. Thus 
deposit insurance was passed and has remained  with us  since, although just 
prior to passage it had little widespread appeal. 
Another area  of  lingering  federal  New  Deal  regulation  is in  agriculture. 
Hoffman and Libecap examine the marketing agreement provisions of the Ag- 
ricultural Adjustment Act of  1933 (AAA). Faced with rapidly falling relative 
agricultural prices and farm income, the AAA was passed to cartelize the in- 
dustry. Until the 1930s there was no consensus that  the federal government 
should intervene in agricultural markets to raise prices. But with the Depres- 
sion and a rural-dominated  Senate, the view was promoted that a prosperous 
farm sector was a linchpin to rapid recovery in general. 
In  basic crops, such as wheat, corn, and cotton, acreage reductions  were 
implemented to reduce supplies, whereas for specialty crops, such as oranges, 
interstate  shipment  restrictions  were  adopted  under marketing  agreements. 
Marketing  agreements generally  called for statewide  shipping quotas, com- 
mensurate with estimated demand at a target price. In 1933 there was optimism 
that such tools could quickly solve the farm problem. But cartelization efforts 
failed to achieve parity price levels. Instead the government was forced by the 
end of  the  1930s to  devise alternative policies  to enhance demand through 
price supports and the direct purchase of agricultural surpluses to raise prices 
to parity levels. These are the policies, rather than those outlined by the AAA 
in 1933, that remain today. 
Hoffman and Libecap examine why cartelization failed in a “best case” ex- 
ample.  With  relatively  few  orange producers and  shippers (compared with 
grains, for example) in just a few regions of the country, cartelization as out- 
lined by the orange marketing agreements seemed assured in 1933. Yet hetero- 
geneous interests in Florida and California and the distributional consequences 
of  the quotas blocked  acceptance of  the agreement in Florida.  Six years  of 
negotiations  between  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Administration  and  the 
Florida industry failed to devise quotas to compensate those who expected to 
be harmed and to be consistent with the cartel’s goals. Evasion and new entry 
were rampant. Similar problems were encountered in other crops, and cartel- 
ization was gradually replaced as the principal instrument of agricultural regu- 
lation. 
Two of the papers address a fundamental shift in regime. One explores the 
movement  in the United States from open immigration to its regulation  and 8  Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Lihecap 
restriction around World War I. The other explores the reasons behind workers’ 
compensation laws. Both demonstrate the influence of interest-group pressures 
in shaping the content and timing of policies. 
Immigration  from  Europe to the  United  States was  virtually  unrestricted 
until the passage of the literacy test in 1917. With that law and the quotas that 
were to follow beginning in 1921, immigration into the United States became 
considerably more restricted. As Goldin shows, the forces leading to the quotas 
took shape by  the  I 890s, when the first literacy test amendment to an immigra- 
tion act was voted on. A variety of interest groups shaped immigration policy, 
including organized labor (through the American Federation of Labor and the 
Knights of Labor), business groups (such  as the National Association of Manu- 
facturers), both old and new immigrants particularly  in American cities, and 
rural  America, which had  long before,  in the  1850s, turned  vehemently  na- 
tivist. 
According  to  Goldin,  a  coalition  that  opposed unrestricted  immigration 
nearly triumphed in the 1890s. Because it was largely a reaction to the depres- 
sion of  the  1890s, it was unstable. The coalition, in somewhat altered form, 
resurfaced in the early 1900s when the combined effects of the declining polit- 
ical power of immigrant groups and falling real wages for lower-skilled work- 
ers after  1910 led to renewed pressure for restriction. The South turned anti- 
immigrant,  after opposing  restriction,  and  much  of  rural  America  remained 
nativist. The final battleground for restriction was in the nation’s cities. 
To analyze the economic and political factors behind the votes on the liter- 
acy test, Goldin provides an in-depth analysis of city-level wage data by occu- 
pation  and industry from  1890 to  1923 to determine the possible economic 
bases of  support for restriction in American cities. The wage data reveal sub- 
stantial and rising negative effects of immigration on both laborer and artisan 
wages from the late 1890s to the early  1920s. The timing of the wage effects 
corresponds  to  the rise in  negative  sentiment  toward  open immigration just 
prior to World War I. Goldin finds that congressional voting on immigration 
restriction in  1915 was linked to the strength of the negative wage effect and 
to the proportion of the population that was foreign born in a House member’s 
district. These factors pulled in two opposing directions-an  increase in the 
foreign born heightened  sentiment to keep the door open, yet a rise in their 
numbers led many workers to oppose immigration because of wage and em- 
ployment effects. In the end the anti-immigrant forces won, in part because of 
the diluted political strength of the foreign born, the mounting economic pres- 
sure for controls, and the increase in nativist sentient with World War I. 
Kantor and Fishback provide another example of state regulation and major 
regime shift in their analysis of Missouri workers’ compensation between  19  1  I 
and 1926. Workers’ compensation was one of the leading Progressive Era re- 
forms and marks the beginning of social insurance in America. It changed the 
legal system governing accident compensation to one of  shared strict liability. 
The laws, which still remain at the state level, were adopted rapidly across the 9  Introduction 
United States in the early part of  the century. although they varied, and con- 
tinue to vary, in coverage and benefits. For example, some states initiated state 
insurance arrangements for workers‘ compensation, while others relied on pri- 
vate insurance companies. Further, the state programs differed as to whether 
they were voluntary or compulsory  and administered  by  appointed  commis- 
sions or the courts. Kantor and Fishback  argue that  these  varying  attributes 
were determined by the relative strength of interest groups having a stake in the 
legislation-insurance  companies, state officials.  organized  labor,  employer 
groups,  and  lawyers.  Hence,  in  their  analysis,  the  authors  examine  how 
interest-group  pressures  in Missouri  affected  both the timing and content  of 
the workers’ compensation  law. 
Missouri provides an interesting case study, in part because the state has an 
anomalous history regarding  workers’ compensation. Legislative voting  and 
public referenda on the issue were drawn out over sixteen years  in Missouri, 
considerably longer than in other states. But this rather curious history allows 
the historian to investigate how competing interest groups shaped the proposed 
legislation. The analysis suggests that interest groups were better able to guide 
legislation than they were to influence referenda outcomes. Organized  labor, 
for example, advocated a state insurance fund and high benefit levels, but these 
attributes were repeatedly  rejected by  voters. As long as workers’ compensa- 
tion  legislation  was referred  to voters.  no state insurance  scheme with high 
benefits could be adopted. Indeed, to obtain final enactment, the state insurance 
provision was jettisoned, and benefit levels were lowered. Comparing legisla- 
tive  votes  with  referenda  results  also  allows  Kantor  and  Fishback  to  see 
whether elected representatives followed their constituents’  wishes and how 
voting behavior changed as provisions were modified during the 1920s. 
The papers  in this  volume have, to various degrees.  examined  aspects of 
governmental (local, state, and federal) intervention and the determinants of 
the timing, content, and administration  of regulatory  policies. The emphasis 
has been on the emergence of interest-group demands and the response of poli- 
ticians to them. Constituent groups pressured government for particular eco- 
nomic policies-immigration  restriction, regulation of railroad and municipal 
utility rates, workers’ compensation, bank taxation and regulatory policies, de- 
posit insurance, and the fixing of agricultural prices. With many different inter- 
est groups and demands on politicians, the enactment of  any piece of legisla- 
tion required trades to achieve a majority consensus. As Poole and Rosenthal 
point out, these exchanges took place within long-standing political coalitions. 
If  interest groups were unstable or if conditions were not ripe for generating 
cohesive stands, then legislation would be delayed, its content would be modi- 
fied, or it would not be administered as initially planned. Several of the papers 
demonstrate these points  in terms of  immigration  restriction,  the  passage of 
workers’  compensation, and  agricultural  regulation.  Further,  responding to 
constituent demands in some cases required shifting regulation across govern- 
ment jurisdictions, as in the move from municipal  to  state utility regulation 10  Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap 
described by Troesken and in the development of railroad regulation, moving 
from the state to the federal level, as in the papers by Kanazawa and NOH,  and 
Poole and Rosenthal. 
By emphasizing the endogeneity of interest-group demands and accompa- 
nying political bargaining,  the  volume’s case studies reveal  much  about the 
relationship  between  politics  and governmental  economic policy.  The case 
studies show that all aspects of government intervention are influenced sub- 
stantially by  interest-group  politics. By  their very  nature,  however,  the case 
studies are less able to address whether governmental actions promoted or hin- 
dered economic development. It seems clear that governments have not been 
immune to the economic effects of their policies. Wallis, Sylla, and Legler’s 
study of state banking regulation reveals that, when regulations  significantly 
retarded economic growth, state governments changed their methods of raising 
revenue. Yet government policy can be a durable legacy that affects economic 
behavior  and  performance long  after  the  initiating  conditions  have  disap- 
peared. Regulatory institutions, once in place, establish and direct rents to par- 
ticular groups, create vested interests with a stake in regulation, and make poli- 
cies difficult to adjust or abolish. For instance, once U.S. immigration quotas 
were enacted in  1921 (and refined to  1929), the law was virtually unchanged 
until a major turnaround in policy in 1965. Similarly, federal deposit insurance, 
which Calomiris and White argue was not as effective as nationwide branch 
banking would have been in the early 1930s, has remained an enduring charac- 
teristic of  U.S. federal bank policy. 
Whether or not government intervention enhances aggregate economic wel- 
fare depends in large measure on whether interest groups will mobilize to pro- 
mote Pareto improvements. Where the net average benefits of interest-group 
organization and lobbying for such changes are substantial, political pressure 
for more optimal policies seems likely. This would be the case, for example, if 
the socially costly aspects of regulation impacted a small, well-defined group, 
which would then have an incentive to organize to change the law. But where 
the social costs are broadly spread and the private benefits narrowly directed, 
no constituent group may be able to organize effectively  to counter narrow 
interests. This condition seems to explain the durability of many financial and 
agricultural regulations despite evidence that they inflict serious costs on most 
in the economy. The size and incidence of the net benefits or costs of regula- 
tion, of course, vary widely. Accordingly, an assessment of the overall impact 
of  government on economic performance will  require many  case studies of 
the kinds offered here to determine whether, on net, government intervention 
promoted or retarded economic growth. 
Another question for subsequent research is whether the underlying politics 
of regulatory policy have changed over the past hundred years. Significant gov- 
ernment intervention, especially at the federal level, took place only after 1880, 
and much of  the expansion of government has been a twentieth-century  phe- 
nomenon. But why did it take so long for government to become a significant 11  Introduction 
part of and actor in the economy? Do interest groups ask more of government 
now than before, and if  so, why? Or are we observing the cumulative effects 
of  long-term  interest-group  demands?  These and  other questions  about the 
government and the economy await further research efforts along the lines pro- 
vided here. This Page Intentionally Left Blank